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Introduction
Many people look to religion for moral guidance. The concept of God in 
the major world religions-Hinduism, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam-is 
intimately connected with that of moral goodness. People worship God, 
in part, because God represents moral goodness (Boss, 1999, p.17).
Traditional African societies are noted for their religiosity 
and so one would naturally expect that when it comes to 
matters of morality they will appeal to some divinities or 
gods for their moral jurisdiction and interpretation of their 
moral codes. Yet, according to Wiredu (1992) and Gyekye 
(1996), this is not true of traditional African societies when it 
comes to finding the source of their moral codes. For the two, 
an appeal to religion as a source of African moral values is a 
mistaken position. This paper challenges their position by 
showing the defects in their arguments and argues that the 
fabric of traditional African morality may tumble if God or 
religion is removed as either the source or part of the source.
 Traditional African societies have been tagged as 'notoriously' 
1
religious  and so one would naturally expect that when it comes to
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matters of morality they will appeal to some divinities or gods for their 
moral jurisdiction and interpretation of their moral codes. Yet, according 
to Kwasi Wiredu (1992) and Kwame Gyekye (1996), the above 
quotation from Judith Boss is not true of traditional African societies 
when it comes to looking for the source of their moral code. For the two, 
an appeal to religion as a source of African moral values is a mistaken 
position. According to Wiredu (1992) and Gyekye (1996), African moral 
values do not appeal to religion and as such religious laws and precepts  
1
 John Mbiti is popularly known for using the phrase 'Africans are notoriously 
religious'. See Mbiti, J. S. (1991).  Introduction to African Religion. Nairobi, 
East African Educational Publishers Ltd.
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The above quotes from Wiredu and Gyekye imply that for the traditional 
African person, an action is right not because it has been ordained or 
prescribed by the gods as right but rather the rightness of an action is 
Kwasi Wiredu also corroborates this humanistic position. Commenting 
on the Akan moral outlook, he asserted that:
What is good in general is what promotes human 
interests…thus, the will of God, not to talk of that of 
any other extra-human being, is logically incapable of 
defining the good (Wiredu, 1992, p.194).
are not the determinant of what is morally right or wrong. What this 
means is that one should not expect to find the moral norms that govern 
the behavior and character of traditional African people embedded in 
religious doctrines or in an appeal to a god.
 Gyekye (1996) was of the view that even though the religion of 
the people has some moral import and influence on their moral choices, it 
is not the essential determinant for their acting morally or not. Now, if 
African moral values are not derived from religion or an appeal to a god 
or divinity, as Gyekye claims, how then do they come to possess their 
moral values? For Gyekye, the answer to this question is that African 
moral values, for him, are derived “from the experiences of the people in 
living together, or in trying to evolve a common and harmonious social 
life” (Gyekye, 1996, p.57). This means that African moral values are 
essentially 'socialistic' and 'humanistic' in character. Socialistic in the 
sense that their moral norms are derived as a result of their relation with 
each other as members of a community, and humanistic in the sense that 
they judge the rightness or wrongness of a moral act based on the ability 
of the particular moral act to either promote or degrade human dignity. 
Thus, in the words of Gyekye: 
In African morality, there is an unrelenting 
preoccupation with human welfare. What is morally 
good is that which brings about human well-being-or is 
supposed, expected, or known to bring about human 
well-being. (Gyekye, 1996, p.57). 
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One major reason given by Gyekye and Wiredu towards the above 
conclusion is this: Gyekye (1996) was of the view that African morality 
could not have its source in an appeal to a divinity because traditional 
African religion is not a 'revealed' religion like that of the Christian or 
Islamic religion. Wiredu (1992), similarly, held that African religions do 
not have institutionalized worship as that of the Christians or the 
Moslems. In effect, what both Wiredu and Gyekye are saying is that 
whereas both Christianity and Islam are revealed religions, in the sense 
that they both claim that the dictates and precepts of their moral code 
 
Gyekye and Wiredu's Argument
judged on the resulting effect, that is, its ability to promote human well-
being. So here, neither the Supreme Being (Onyankopon), the smaller 
gods (abosom) nor any other forms of divinities are looked up to as an 
authority or source of what is morally acceptable or unacceptable. This 
will therefore imply that the 'Divine Command Theory' (the theory 
which claims that an action is morally right or wrong only because God 
or a divinity prescribes it as right or) does not apply in traditional African 
moral ethics. African moral values, by drawing the rightness or 
wrongness of an action on its effect or outcome implies a 
consequentialist theory of morality which generally bases its 
prescription to a moral act on the after effect of an action. In the 
traditional African context, the kind of outcome for your act, if it is to be 
considered morally right, should aim at the promotion or enhancement of 
2
human well-being.  What arguments led Wiredu and Gyekye to the 
conclusion that African moral values are social and humanistic in 
character and as such had no appeal to God or religion?
2
 It's not aim of this paper to show what constitute human well-being or 
enhancement. That can make for a different paper because it may divert the 
focus of this paper which is to dispute the claim by Wiredu and Gyekye that 
African moral values are not derived from their religion.
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were revealed by God through some individuals (Jesus Christ in the case 
of the Christian religion and the Prophet Mohammed in the case of 
Islam), traditional African religions profess no such revelations. This is 
coupled with the fact that both the Christian and Islamic religions have 
holy books which contain a list of their moral norms and conducts as 
revealed by their God through their holy prophets, whereas traditional 
African religions do not have any holy books which they can use as a 
source, or an authority of their moral code. Gyekye, therefore, argues that 
traditional African religions, not being a revealed religion, could not 
have access to the commandments of God to use as a basis of their moral 
system. In other words, since traditional African people do not have a 
handbook given to them by God or their gods, there is no way traditional 
African people could have come to the conception of the morally good 
and bad if they had to depend on God or the gods for them. Thus, Gyekye 
emphatically claims that:
Traditional African religion is not a revealed religion 
and therefore the people do not—how could they? 
—have access to the commandments of God to use as a 
basis of their moral system. (Gyekye, 1996, p.56)
Gyekye and Wiredu think this is possible. For them, what makes 
it possible is that traditional African morality has its basis in what 
promotes the well-being of the people and not necessarily in what this or 
that god says. Wiredu and Gyekye's arguments could be further 
knowledge of moral norms even if there were no gods he so much 
reveres.
The implications of these arguments by both Wiredu and Gyekye may, 
upon first encounter, appear grievous to someone who has for all his life 
time looked up to the gods as the ultimate source of all moral codes 
without whom there could be no conception of what is right or wrong. 
This person will be baffled to know that, given the arguments raised by 
Gyekye and Wiredu, morality can thrive in traditional African societies 
even if they had no beliefs in the existence of gods or in the Supreme 
being, that is, you can expect a traditional African to act morally or have 
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supported by the argument that given the reality that there exists the 
belief in the existence of plurality of gods in the traditional African 
metaphysical world outlook there are bound to be some amount of 
conflict when it comes to deciding whether some actions are morally 
acceptable or not. Traditional Africans, apart from the belief in the 
existence of a Supreme God, also believe in countless number of smaller 
gods whose spirits are believed to dwell in nature. Thus, the spirits of 
these gods are to be found in trees, stones, mountains, rivers, in the sun, 
the moon and in the sea. Apart from gods that belong to one entire 
community there are also gods that belong to clans and families 
(nuclear), as well as the existence of personal gods. Because of this 
multiplicity of gods, there are bound to be inconsistencies to what 
constitutes a morally right action if traditional African societies were to 
rely on the dictates of their gods as their source of moral code. Thus, it 
makes sense to look for the source of their morality outside of their 
religion.
I think here readers should note that I am not concerned with the 
metaphysical question of whether these gods actually exist or not in this 
paper. This needs not to be established in order to make sense of this 
discourse. This discourse is only making a philosophical analysis of what 
is already held or believed to be true by traditional African societies.  Let 
us now examine this humanistic alternative as suggested by Wiredu and 
Gyekye as the source of African moral values further.
Wiredu and Gyekye's Humanistic and Socialistic Position
Traditional African societies are known to be communal in nature, such 
that they think and act always in the community's interest rather than in 
their own personal interest. Thus, in traditional African societies there is
some close affinity among family members which create a strong sense 
of belonging and solidarity among individuals in the family, which 
further extends to the rest of the community at large. There is also direct 
community participation in the affairs of the community and everyone 
shows or is expected to show some altruistic concern for his or her 
neighbour. In these communal societies everything done must be done 
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Despite these arguments given by Wiredu and Gyekye to explain 
why they think African morality can prevail without an appeal to a god, it 
is my position that both Wiredu and Gyekye have belittled the important  
role that God, the gods and other divinities play in the moral affairs of 
traditional African people. 
The Problem with Gyekye and Wiredu's Position
towards the promotion of the common good which is similar to the good 
3
of all.  
Wiredu and Gyekye held that given such social formation where 
everything is done towards the good of all, it only makes sense to say that 
the promotion of the common good or that which interests all is also the 
source of the people's moral code. Thus, one can expect that the people's 
moral conduct or behavior is guided by the principle of the promotion of 
human wellbeing. Gyekye (1997) referred to this as the 'ethic of 
responsibility' of which he meant “a caring attitude or conduct that one 
feels one ought to adopt with respect to the well-being of another person 
or other persons” (Gyekye, 1997, p.66). He added that such 
responsibilities include the responsibility to help others in distress, the 
responsibility to show concern for the welfare of others, the 
responsibility not to harm others, and so on. Gyekye believed that in 
traditional African societies, bringing up children to feel that they have 
these responsibilities towards others is part of the whole process of 
socialization, moral and character formation.
A morality based on humanism, as argued by Gyekye and Wiredu, 
suggests a consequentialist approach to morality and as such faces all the 
difficulties that any consequentialist moral theory might face. For  
3
 For a more vivid description of the features of a traditional communal society 
and for a better appreciation of the notion of common good as understood in 
traditional communitarian African societies see Gyekye, K.  (1997). Tradition 
and Modernity. Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 35-76.
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example, do traditional African people have in mind the entire 
consequence of all their moral actions in every moral decision they 
make? If no, how then are they able to tell the overall or immediate effect 
of their action on humanity or even on their immediate community? In 
practice, this will become a major headache for any person making a 
moral decision if we are to go by Gyekye and Wiredu's approach. This is 
because a consequentialist theory does not take into account your 
intention to do good by your action but only the end result of your action 
which for Gyekye and Wiredu, should be geared towards the promotion 
of human well-being. 
 Similarly, Wiredu and Gyekye's humanistic perspective of 
morality suggests that everyone in the society will have to know what 
exactly promotes human well-being or at least have a common notion of 
what constitutes human well-being. This is highly improbable since 
every individual has his or her own definition of what should constitute 
human well-being. This may lead to having contingent moral rules that 
treat each moral case differently based on your estimation of what 
constitutes human well-being In effect, Gyekye and Wiredu's humanistic 
perspective of morality as the source of traditional African moral code, if 
true, will be a burdensome approach to adopt in making moral decisions. 
In a similar outcome, if traditional Africans are to judge the 
moral rightness or wrongness of their action on its ability to further 
human well-being or not, then it will mean, as already established, that 
they are able to tell which actions are moral only after the action has been 
effected and the resulting consequence is evaluated. If the consequence 
was able to promote the well-being of humanity or the common good 
then the action is judged to be moral. If this is accepted then it will make 
what is acceptable as moral and immoral be determined upon a try and 
error basis. This is because no two moral situations are ever the same in 
every facet. No matter what, there will be some distinguishing 
contingencies that will not allow one to use the same moral yardstick for 
two moral situations. And since the two moral situations are different in a 
way or two, they might lead to two different overall outcomes depending 
on the choice made.  This will mean that an individual faced with a 
particular moral dilemma has to compare his current situation with other 
past situation(s) he considers similar and upon that decide on how or how  
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 Let us now move on from the resemblance the humanistic moral 
perspective has with other forms of consequentialist moral theory in 
regards to its problems and challenges to other important challenges it 
faces. One major argument raised by Gyekye and Wiredu to show that 
religion is not a source of traditional African moral values is the fact that 
African traditional religion is not a revealed religion or an 
institutionalized worship and as such there are no books in which one 
could find the stipulated moral will of the gods, as it is for the Christian or 
Islamic religion. The fact that there are no written moral codes in 
traditional African societies may be undeniably true, yet, one does not 
need a revealed or holy book from God in order for God to be the source 
of one's morality. African Traditional religions hold the Supreme Being 
as the source of all goodness. God or the Supreme Being is seen to be the 
ultimate good, as Gyekye (1996) himself conceded: “God is held by 
Africans not only to be the overlord of human society but also to have a 
superbly moral character” (Gyekye, 1996, p.57). One can logically infer 
from this that God will naturally expect His creation to pursue good as 
well. As such, a person without any revealed or holy book from God can 
commit himself into doing morally right actions since doing so, in his 
view, constitutes what God will expect from him. Thus, he does good
deeds like giving to the poor, helping the weak and welcoming strangers 
to his place of abode not because he has read in a holy book somewhere 
that God says he should do them, but because he has belief in the 
not to act in other to enhance human well-being. Since no two moral 
dilemmas are entirely the same, the moral agent will have to resort to his 
own calculations and predictive prowess most of the time in making 
moral decisions. He will then have to wait to see how events turn out after 
making his moral choice before he can either tap himself on the back for a 
job well done or hate himself for making a bad moral choice. All these 
add to the burdensomeness of Gyekye and Wiredu's humanistic moral 
perspective on African morality.
existence of a Supreme Being who represents perfect goodness and who 
will expect all who revere Him to seek to be good as well. Here, the 
individual source of morality is found simply in his belief in the perfect 
goodness of God and in his belief that God rewards good deeds. He does 
not need a written book to know what individual acts God approves to be
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good or not good but in every moral situation he asks himself the 
question—what will a good God expects from me? —and then does it. It 
is therefore possible for African moral values to thrive just on the belief 
in the perfect goodness of God. It will therefore be erroneous to hold that 
without a revealed holy book of a sort or some form of institutionalism, it 
will be impossible for one to derive the source of one's moral code from 
God. Thus, Beld (2001) was spot on to note that: 
 Again, Gyekye (1996) acknowledges that traditional African 
societies are very religious. In fact, he held that it is because of the 
overwhelming influence of religion in almost every aspect of their lives 
that had made many to commit the error into thinking that the source of 
their moral values also lies in their religion. The religious attitude of  
So, it is possible that man has this attribute of goodness in him inherited 
from his creator. As another popular Akan proverb goes, obi nkyere 
akora nyame (no one directs a child to God), so in effect no book is 
needed as such to teach man what constitutes a morally good act.
…God is considered to be good. Thus, the proverb, 
goodness is the prime characteristic of God (papa ye 
Nyame su a edi kan). God is identified with goodness 
(Nyame ne papa) (Gyekye, 1995, p.136).
…because DCT (Divine Command Theory) is silent on 
the way the divine will is made known, it does not 
follow from the theory that God's commands are 
exclusively mediated through Scripture or the Church 
(Beld, 2001, p.397). 
A likely question that arises is, how anybody will come to know what a 
good God expects of him if he does not have any idea of what 'goodness' 
is all about? Here, I resort to a popular Akan proverb that translates 
'everyone is a child of God, no one is a child of the earth'. Now, if 
everyone one is a child of God, then we expect that everyone will bear 
some attributes of God in them. As mentioned above, the Akans perceive 
God as the ultimate source of goodness. This, Gyekye himself pointed 
out: 
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traditional African societies has also been corroborated by many other 
African philosophers. If religion had always affected traditional African 
people in almost every aspect of their lives then it creates a problem for 
Wiredu and Gyekye's theory that religion is not a source of African moral 
values. It makes it difficult, if not impossible, for anyone to test the truth 
in their thesis. That is, how are we able to tell that truly the source of 
African moral values is found not in their religion but rather in their 
humanism, when one agrees that the totality of their lives is highly 
influenced by their religion? Surely, the religious attitude of the 
traditional African people, the fact that religion is believed to permeate 
every aspect of their lives, makes it difficult for anyone to draw that sharp 
divide between what has religious influence from those that does not. 
Based on this, it makes sense to say that the religion of the African people 
or their belief in God, to a large extent, has some influence as a source of 
their moral code.
In all fairness to Gyekye, I must acknowledge, as noted earlier, 
that Gyekye gives some credence to the role religion plays in the lives of 
traditional African people but only limits it to the motivation to act moral.  
He held that “religion constitutes parts of the sanctions that are in play in 
matters of moral practice” (Gyekye, 1996, p.58). That is to say, even 
though religion is not the people's source of morality, it plays a vital role 
in motivating the people to act morally. Gyekye may be quite right to say 
religion does play a motivating role in making people act morally but I 
argue that a person's relation with God does not only provide him with 
moral motivation, it also enables him to see his moral obligations as 
derived from that particular relation. This is what seems to prevail in the 
African context. When faced with a moral dilemma, it is more practically 
conceivable for the African to think of what might be acceptable by the 
gods than what will further human well-being. 
Taboos are certain behaviors or activities that are supposed to be avoided 
in society. There is, for example, a taboo that says 'do not have sex on the 
farm or with a woman in her menstrual period'. Another taboo says 'a 
menstruating woman should not go to the stream or step into a river or 
cook for the husband' and a whole lot of others were said to attract 
What makes this position more plausible is the existence of 
taboos in traditional African societies as part of their moral norms. 
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One can clearly see the humanistic import of some of these 
taboos. Not having sex on the farm, for example, may help the people to 
prevent snake bites and perhaps respect the dignity they give to sex. 
Again, not allowing menstruating women in the streams and rivers could 
prevent the spread of communicable diseases since the rivers and 
streams are the people's source of drinking water. Despite these 
humanistic values found in these taboos, one will however be belittling 
the import of the gods here if one assumes that the gods were just used as 
motivation to prevent the people from breaking the taboos. The gods are 
to the people more than just a motivation to act morally. They are also 
seen as authenticators and validators of these taboos. The gods' 
ascription to the taboos makes the taboos credible and acceptable. This 
is, perhaps, the reason why when someone breaks a taboo he does not just 
go and say I am sorry to the chief or to the victim but have to undergo 
certain rituals to pacify the gods. He does so because he has not just failed 
to enhance human well-being but has broken a sacred law of the gods.
Now a dilemma that comes as a result of the argument above is 
this: if traditional African religion is not a revealed religion, such that 
there is no holy book telling the people what they should do and not do, 
how can the people have access to taboos especially if I am claiming 
these taboos are seen by the people as God-given? Herein lies the 
importance of the priests in African traditional societies. The priests are 
seen by the people as the servants of the gods. The people, in fact, believe 
that the gods are able to possess some individuals and use them to do their 
bidding. Thus, the priests serve as direct link between the people and the 
4
gods, as well as, the ancestors.  These priests are therefore seen as 
punishment from the gods in the form of curses that could affect not just 
the perpetuator of the 'abominable' act but the entire family, and 
sometimes generations yet unborn. At other times, the repercussions 
could extend to the entire community. 
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4
 Ancestors are considered to be spirits of certain dead relations who are believed 
to have led an exemplary life during their time spend on earth. These ancestral 
spirits are believed to have both the experience of mortal life and spiritual life 
custodians of the moral expectations of the gods and are consulted when 
the need arises. They are also the final determinant of what punishment to 
be given to the person who breaks a taboo even after the chiefs and elders' 
verdicts are appealed. Abdulai (2000) reports of two African proverbs 
that actually corroborate this; the first one says “any case that God has 
settled no man can subvert (Abdulai, 2000, p.25)” while the second reads   
“God's case no appeal (Abdulai, 2000, p.66).” These two proverbs 
demonstrate that God was considered to have the final say in any moral 
matters. The people believed they could come to know of God's verdicts 
through the priests. If the humanistic claim was enough then one would 
expect the people to just rely on the effect of the action and give their 
verdict and then these two proverbs will have no relevance to the people.
 Furthermore, despite the fact that most African proverbs 
concerning morality use nature as its reference, it is also possible to find 
many African proverbs on morality that have God used as reference. For 
example, consider this Akan proverb that speaks about humility: 
obosomakotere se: oye ahobrease ma onyakopon nti na obiara nkyen na 
ahodee. This proverb, according to Appiah (2000), literallytranslates 
“the chameleon says: he is humble before God; therefore no one is 
wealthier than he is (Appiah, proverb number 1153, p. 228).” Thus, this 
proverb, in effect, implies that God rewards the humble.
Another example of a moral proverb with God as its reference is 
this proverb that speaks against cheating: wo bu koto kwasia a, onyame 
hwe wo to. Appiah (2000) literally translates this proverb to mean “if you 
cheat a crab, God sees your bottom.” This is a proverb that suggests that 
God abhors cheating and sees everything we do. 
Conclusion
In conclusion, I have, in this paper, shown that Wiredu and Gyekye have 
belittled the important role traditional religion and their gods play in the 
having lived in the world of man and now in the world of the spirits. They are 
also known to have supernatural powers to bless or curse the living. They are 
also believed to be protectors of clans against bad omens and spirits.
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making of African moral values. Religion may not theoretically be the 
entire source of their moral code, yet its role is not to be relegated to just a 
motivation to act morally but instead, religion is to be seen as somewhat 
part of the people's sources of morality in practice. Traditional African 
religion may not be a revealed religion, nevertheless the people do look 
to the Supreme Being and smaller gods for answers to their moral 
dilemmas. “Religious attitudes are indeed a powerful source of morally 
good and praiseworthy behavior” (to borrow the words of Ton Van Den 
5
Beld),  for the traditional African people. The suggestion by Wiredu and 
Gyekye that African moral values only have their source in humanism, 
that is, in the promotion of human well-being will not be adequate or a 
true reflection of what actually is the case. To take God or religion away 
from morality for the traditional African people will bring down the 
whole moral system, at least not until the people learn to properly 
distinguish religion from other aspect of their lives. Thus, I am in 
agreement with Ton Van Den Beld (2001) assertion that: 
African moral codes cannot stand entirely on their own without their 
religion, without a belief in a God who is seen to be the embodiment of 
goodness.
…if a theistic metaphysic is given up and replaced by a 
naturalist atheist metaphysic, this move cannot but have 
repercussions in the moral thought which was supported 
by it (Beld, p.390-391). 
5
  Beld, T. V. D. (2001), p. 385.
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